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We characterize a rule in cost spanning tree problems using an additiv-
ity property and some basic properties. If the set of possible agents has at
least three agents, these basic properties are symmetry and separability. If
the set of possible agents has two agents, we must add positivity. In both
characterizations we can replace separability by population monotonicity.
JEL Codes: C71, D70, D85.
Keywords: cost spanning tree problems, additivity, characterization.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many problems involving network formation have been studied in the opera-
tions research and the economic literature. In operations research two issues
have been extensively explored: the design of eﬃcient algorithms and the com-
putational complexity. The economic literature focuses on aspects such like the
cost sharing of the network and the design of mechanisms trying to explain the
way in which the network forms.
In this paper we focus on the cost sharing aspect. Our contribution can
be considered in the well-known literature of cost allocation. We assume that
there are no external forces (for example, the market) which determine the
ﬁnal allocation. Agents can achieve agreements directly among themselves, or
indirectly by letting the ﬁnal decision to a neutral referee. In both cases the
important issue is to ﬁnd a "fair allocation" of the cost.
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1In particular we study cost spanning tree problems (cstp). Consider that a
group of agents, located at diﬀerent geographical places, want some particular
service which can only be provided by a common supplier, called the source.
Agents will be served through connections which entail some cost. However, they
do not care whether they are connected directly or indirectly to the source. This
situation is described by a symmetric matrix C, which denotes the connection
costs.
We assume that agents construct a minimal cost spanning tree (mcst). The
question is how to divide the cost associated with the mcst between the agents.
Diﬀerent rules give diﬀerent answers to this question. One of the most important
topics is the axiomatic characterization of rules. The idea is to propose desirable
properties and to ﬁnd out which of them characterize each rule. Properties often
help agents to compare diﬀerent rules and to decide which rule is preferred in a
particular situation.
Additivity is a standard property and it has been used in many situations.
Additivity says, roughly speaking, that if our problem is the sum of small prob-
lems, the solution to our problem must be the sum of the solutions of the small
problems.
The justiﬁcation of additivity, as a fairness property, is not as clear as with
other properties (for example, eﬃciency or symmetry). Nevertheless, from the
mathematical point of view it is a very appealing property because if a rule is
additive we only need to care about small problems. This property simpliﬁes
our work because small problems are usually much easier to solve.
In many problems it is possible to characterize rules with additivity and very
"basic" properties. Usually, the rules satisfying additivity are very nice rules.
This provides an ex-post justiﬁcation of additivity as a fairness property. Let
us mention some examples.
The Shapley value, the most important value in cooperative games with
transferable utility, is characterized by additivity and other properties (eﬃ-
ciency, symmetry, and dummy). If we compare the Shapley value with other
prominent values (for example the nucleolus) we realize that these values sat-
isfy all the properties characterizing the Shapley value except additivity. In
bankruptcy problems and other related problems, it is possible to character-
ize the three rules based on the principles of proportionality, equal award, and
equal loss with additivity and other properties, like symmetry and continuity.
See Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004a) for a summary of these results. In
cost sharing problems, Moulin and Shenker (1994) characterize the serial cost
sharing rule with additivity and other properties.
2The natural formulation of additivity in cstp is the following: a rule ψ satis-
ﬁes additivity if and only if ψ (C + C0)=ψ(C)+ψ (C0) for all cstp C and C0.
This property is very demanding and no rule satisﬁes it. The reason is that we
are comparing very diﬀerent problems, and thus the mcst of C, C0,a n dC +C0
can be very diﬀerent.
Hence, we introduce a property called restricted additivity. The idea is to
claim the condition ψ (C + C0)=ψ (C)+ψ (C0) only when the problems C, C0,
and C + C0 are "similar". We consider as similar problems those which satisfy
two conditions. First, they have a common mcst. S e c o n d ,i fw eo r d e rt h ea r c s
of the common mcst by non-decreasing cost, we can obtain the same order in
C as in C0.
We prove that if a rule satisﬁes restricted additivity then it is enough to
know how this rule works in small problems. Our small problems are those in
which the connection costs could be either 0 or x for some ﬁxed x.
We present four "basic" properties of rules: Symmetry, positivity, separabil-
ity, and population monotonicity. Symmetry says that symmetric agents must
pay the same. Two agents are symmetric if their connection costs are the same.
Positivity says that every agent must pay at least 0.
Separability appears in Megiddo (1978), Granot and Huberman (1981), and
Granot and Maschler (1998) with the name of decomposition. It also appears
in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004b) with the name of separability. Two
subsets of agents can connect to the source separately or jointly. If there are no
savings when they connect jointly, separability says that agents must pay the
same in both circumstances.
Population monotonicity says that if new agents join the society, no former
agent can be worse. This is a standard property, which has been used in many
diﬀerent situations.
Our results are the following. If the set of possible agents has at least three
members, then there is a unique rule satisfying restricted additivity, symme-
try, and separability. If the set of possible agents has exactly two members,
t h e nt h e r ei sau n i q u er u l es a t i s f y i n gp o s i t ivity, restricted additivity, symme-
try, and separability. In both cases we can replace separability by population
monotonicity.
The rule we obtain in these characterizations is already present in the lit-
erature. This rule was introduced by Feltkamp, Tijs, and Muto (1994) and
studied later by Branzei, Moretti, Norde, and Tijs (2003) and Bergantiños and
Vidal-Puga (2004b).
Our paper is very related to the paper of Branzei et al (2003) because they
3also characterize this rule using an additivity property and other properties. Our
additivity property implies their additivity property because we claim the con-
dition ψ(C + C0)=ψ(C)+ψ (C0) in more cases. This is a small improvement
with respect to their results. The most important improvement is in relation to
the other properties. We claim that our properties are much more appealing.
In the last section we comment this aspect in more detail.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model.
In Section 3 we present our results. In Section 4 we compare our results with
Branzei et al (2003).
2 Cost spanning tree problems
In this section we introduce cost spanning tree problems. We do it following the
notation of Kar (2002) and Dutta and Kar (2002).
Let N be the set of all possible agents. N can be ﬁnite or inﬁnite (N =
{1,2,...}). We are interested in networks whose nodes are elements of a set
N0 = N ∪ {0},w h e r eN ⊂ N is ﬁnite and 0 is a special node called the source.
Usually we take N = {1,...,n}. Our interest lies on networks where each node
in N is (directly or indirectly) connected to the source.
Let ΠN be the set of all orders over the ﬁnite set N. Given π ∈ ΠN, let
Pre(i,π) denote the set of elements of N which come before i in the order
given by π, i. e. Pre(i,π)={j ∈ N | π (j) <π(i)}.
A cost matrix C =( cij)i,j∈N0 on N represents the cost of direct link between
any pair of nodes. We assume that cij = cji ≥ 0 for each i,j ∈ N0 and cii =0
for each i ∈ N0.
We denote by CN the set of all cost matrices on N.G i v e nC, C0 ∈ CN we
say C ≤ C0 if cij ≤ c0
ij for all i,j ∈ N0.
A cost spanning tree problem,b r i e ﬂy cstp, is a pair (N0,C) where N ⊂ N is
the ﬁnite set of agents, 0 is the source, and C ∈ CN is the cost matrix.
Given a cstp (N0,C), we denote the cstp induced by C in S ⊂ N as (S0,C).
A network g over N0 is a subset of {(i,j) | i,j ∈ N0}. The elements of g are
called arcs.S i n c ecij = cji we will work with undirected arcs, i.e (i,j)=( j,i).
Given a network g and a pair of nodes i and j,apath from i to j in g is a
sequence of arcs {(ih−1,i h)}
l
h=1 satisfying (ih−1,i h) ∈ g for all h ∈ {1,2,...,l},
i = i0 and j = il.W ed e n o t eb yGN the set of all networks over N0.
A tree is a network satisfying that for each i ∈ N t h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u ep a t h





represents the ﬁrst agent in the unique path in t from i to 0. We denote by GN
0
4the set of trees over N0.





When there are no ambiguities, we write c(g) or c(C,g) instead of c(N0,C,g).
A minimum cost spanning tree for (N0,C),b r i e ﬂyamcst, is a tree t ∈ GN
0
such that c(t)= m i n
g∈GN c(g). It is well-known in the literature about cstp that
there exists a mcst, even though it does not need to be unique. Given a cstp
(N0,C) we denote by m(N0,C) the cost associated with any mcst t in (N0,C).
Given a cstp (N0,C), Prim (1957) provides an algorithm for computing the
mcst. The idea of this algorithm is quite simple: starting from the source we
construct a network by consecutively adding arcs with the lowest cost, without
introducing cycles.
Formally, Prim’s algorithm is deﬁned as follows. We start with S0 = {0}
and g0 = ∅.
Stage 1: Take the arc (0,i) such that c0i =m i n
j∈N
{c0j}. If there are several
arcs (0,i) satisfying this condition, select one of them. Now, S1 = {0,i} and
g1 = {(0,i)}.
Stage p+1. Assume that we have deﬁned Sp and gp. We now deﬁne Sp+1 and




such that ci0i =m i n





satisfying this condition, select one of them. Now, Sp+1 = Sp ∪ {i}





This process ﬁnishes in n stages. We say that gn is a tree obtained via
Prim’s algorithm. Notice that this algorithm leads to a tree, but not necessarily
unique.
A TU game is a pair (N,w) where N ⊂ N and w :2 N → R satisﬁes that
w(∅)=0 . We denote by Sh(N,w) the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of the
TU game (N,w).
Bird (1976) associates each cstp (N0,C) with a TU game (N,vC) where for
each coalition S ⊂ N,
vC (S)=m(S0,C).
Usually, we write v instead of vC.
Given a cstp (N0,C), Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004b) say that C is a
canonical matrix if there exists a mcst t in (N0,C) satisfying the two following
conditions:
5(A1) t = {(ip−1,i p)}
n
p=1 where i0 =0(the source).






Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004b) introduce an algorithm for associating






i∈N be a mcst in (N0,C).T a k e C0 = C, S0 = {0}, and
g0 = ∅.
Stage 1. We deﬁne T1 =
©
i ∈ N | i0 =0
ª
. Take an arc (0,i 1) such that
i1 ∈ T1 and c0i1 =m i n
i∈T1
{c0i}. If there are several arcs satisfying this condition,
take one of them. Now C1 = C0,S 1 = {0,i 1}, and g1 = {(0,i 1)}.
Assume that we have deﬁned Stage r for all r ≤ p. We now deﬁne Stage
p +1when p +1≤ n.
Stage p +1 . We deﬁne Tp+1 =
©








p+1ip+1 =m i n
i∈Tp+1
{ci0i}. If there are several arcs





if (k,j) 6=( ip,i p+1) and c
p+1
ipip+1 = ci0
p+1ip+1.M o r e o v e r ,Sp+1 = Sp ∪ {ip+1} and
gp+1 = gp ∪ {(ip,i p+1)}.
Stage n+1.W ed e ﬁne C∗ such that c∗






for all ip,i q ∈ N0,
p<q .Moreover, t = gn.
One of the most important issues addressed in the literature about cstp is
how to divide the cost of connecting agents to the source among them.




ψi (N0,C)=m(N0,C). As usually, ψi (N0,C) represents
the cost assigned to agent i. Notice that we implicitly assume that agents build
a mcst. As far as we know, all the rules proposed in the literature make this
assumption.
There are several rules studied in the literature. In this paper we focus on a
rule introduced by Feltkamp, Tijs, and Muto (1994) and called Equal Remaining
Obligations (ERO). Kruskal (1956) introduced an algorithm for computing the
mcst of a cstp. Feltkamp, Tijs, and Muto (1994) deﬁne ERO through Kruskal’s
algorithm. Initially, each agent has an obligation 1 and the network is empty.
We now apply Kruskal’s algorithm and the obligations of the agents decrease
w h e nw ea d da na r ct ot h en e t w o r k .T h i so b l i g a t i o ni s 1
ni, where ni is the number
of agents connected directly or indirectly to agent i through the network. At
each step of the algorithm, each agent pays the part of the cost of the arc we
add given by the diﬀerence between his obligation before adding the arc, and his
6obligation after adding the arc. See Feltkamp et al (1994) for a formal deﬁnition.
On the other hand, Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004b) deﬁne the rule ϕ
as
ϕ(N0,C)=Sh(N,vC∗)
where C∗ is the canonical matrix associated to C through the algorithm. They
prove that, surprisingly, ϕ coincides with ERO.
In our proofs the canonical form plays an important role. Thus, we use the
same notation as in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004b).
Finally, we deﬁne C-components following Norde et al (2004). This concept
will be used in some of the proofs. Given a cstp (N0,C) and S ⊂ N,w es a y
that i, j ∈ N, i 6= j are (C,S)-connected if there exists a path g from i to j
satisfying that g ∈ GS and ckl =0for all (k,l) ∈ g. We say that S ⊂ N is a
C-components if two conditions hold. First, for all i,j ∈ S, i and j are (C,S)-
connected. Second, S is maximal, i.e. if S Ã T there exist i,j ∈ T, i 6= j such
that i and j are not (C,T)-connected.
Norde et al (2004) prove that the set of C-components is a partition of N.
3 The axiomatic characterization
In this section we present an axiomatic characterization of ϕ using a (restricted)
additivity property.
We ﬁrst present the natural formulation of additivity in cstp problems. We
argue that this property is very demanding, which produces that no rule satisﬁes
it. Then, we restrict additivity to a subclass of problems in order to ﬁnd rules
satisfying it.
Later, we present some "basic" properties of rules. We present four prop-
erties. Symmetry (symmetric agents must pay the same) and positivity (every
agent must pay al least 0) do not need any further justiﬁcation. We also con-
sider separability, introduced by Granot and Huberman (1984), and population
monotonicity, which has been used in many diﬀerent situations.
Our results are the following. If the set of possible agents N has at least
three members, ϕ is the unique rule satisfying restricted additivity, symmetry,
and separability. If the set of possible agents has exactly two members, ϕ is the
unique rule satisfying positivity, restricted additivity, symmetry, and separabil-
ity.
7We say that ψ satisﬁes additivity (ADD) if for all cstp (N0,C) and (N0,C0),
ψ (N0,C+ C0)=ψ (N0,C)+ψ (N0,C0).























































If we insist on additive rules, we cannot divide the minimum cost among
agents. Of course, we do not insist on additivity.
We take a diﬀerent approach. Namely, we claim additivity when the pair of
problems are "similar", and not in any case (as with ADD). Moreover, we are
also interested to claim additivity in a large class of problems.
In cstp there exists an additivity property called cone-wise positive linearity
(CPL), which has been introduced by Branzei et al (2003).
We say that ψ satisﬁes CPL if
ψ (N0,C+ C0)=ψ(N0,C)+ψ (N0,C0)
for all cstp (N0,C) and (N0,C0) such that given i,j,k,l ∈ N0,t h e ncij ≤ ckl if
and only if c0
ij ≤ c0
kl.
Notice that according to this deﬁnition two problems are "similar" when,
ordering the arcs by their cost we can obtain the same order in C and C0 .
Remark 1.B r a n z e iet al (2003) deﬁne CPL in a way a little bit diﬀerent.
Take x,x0 ≥ 0. They say that a rule ψ satisﬁes CPL if
ψ(N0,xC+ x0C0)=xψ(N0,C)+x0ψ (N0,C0)
when (N0,C) and (N0,C0) are "similar"; xC is the cost matrix where the con-
nection cost between i and j is xcij.
8It is not diﬃcult to check that the characterization of Branzei et al (2003)
also holds with our deﬁnition. We present it in a diﬀerent way only because it
is simpler.
We now introduce our additivity property. If we want to claim ψ (N0,C+ C0)=
ψ (N0,C)+ψ (N0,C0), we need, as we argue before, that m(N0,C+ C0)=
m(N0,C)+m(N0,C0).
Assume that t is a mcst in (N0,C+ C0) and m(N0,C+ C0)=m(N0,C)+




Thus, t is a mcst in (N0,C) and (N0,C0). Assume that we order the arcs of
t by non-decreasing cost. If we obtain the same order in (N0,C) and (N0,C0)
we claim additivity on these problems. This is our idea of "similar" problems.
We now present the deﬁnition formally. We say that ψ satisﬁes restricted
additivity (RA) if
ψ (N0,C+ C0)=ψ(N0,C)+ψ (N0,C0)





in (N0,C), (N0,C0), and (N0,C+ C0) a n da no r d e rπ =( i1,...,in) ∈ ΠN such
that ci0
1i1 ≤ ci0





2i2 ≤ ... ≤ c0
i0
nin.
It is not diﬃcult to check that if we deﬁne RA as ψ (N0,xC+ x0C0)=
xψ (N0,C)+x0ψ(N0,C0) where x,x0 ≥ 0 our results do not change.
In the next proposition we prove that there exists a relation between both
additivity properties.
Proposition 1.I fψ satisﬁes RA,t h e nψ also satisﬁes CPL.
Proof. Even though this result is very intuitive we give a formal proof. Let
ψ be a rule satisfying RA.
Take (N0,C) and (N0,C0) as in the deﬁnition of CPL. Since ψ satisﬁes





(N0,C0), and (N0,C+ C0) a n da no r d e rπ =( i1,...,in) ∈ ΠN such that ci0
1i1 ≤
ci0












i∈N be a mcst obtained following Prim’s algorithm when we
apply it to (N0,C). Without loss of generality we assume that for all i =1 ,...,n




. We now prove that t is also a mcst in (N0,C0).
9Since arc (0,1) is selected in the ﬁrst stage of Prim’s algorithm when we
apply it to (N0,C) we know that c01 =m i n
j∈N
{c0j}. Then, c0






and c01 + c0






because C and C0 satisfy the conditions of the
deﬁnition of CPL. Thus, arc (0,1) can be selected in the ﬁrst stage of Prim’s
algorithm when we apply it to (N0,C0) and (N0,C+ C0).
If we repeat this argument until Stage n we deduce that t can be obtained
through Prim’s algorithm when we apply it to (N0,C0) and (N0,C+ C0). Then,
t is a mcst in (N0,C) and (N0,C+ C0).
Take π =( i1,...,in) ∈ ΠN such that ci0
1i1 ≤ ci0
2i2 ≤ ... ≤ ci0
nin. Since (N0,C0)







nin. Then, (N0,C) and (N0,C0) satisfy the conditions of the deﬁnition of
RA and hence ψ (N0,C+ C0)=ψ (N0,C)+ψ (N0,C0). ¥
As we argue at the beginning of this section we can not claim ψ(N0,C+ C0)=
ψ (N0,C)+ψ (N0,C0) in all cases. From the proof of Proposition 1 we deduce
that RA claims this condition in more cases than CPL. Then, RA is closer to
ADD than CPL.
We now introduce the "basic" properties we use in our characterization re-
sults.
Given a cstp (N0,C),w es a yt h a ti,j ∈ N, i 6= j are symmetric if for all
k ∈ N0 \{ i,j},c ik = cjk.
We say that ψ satisﬁes symmetry (SYM) if for all cstp (N0,C) and all pair
of symmetric agents i,j ∈ N,
ψi (N0,C)=ψj (N0,C).
We say that ψ satisﬁes positivity (POS) if for all cstp (N0,C) and all i ∈ N,
ψi (N0,C) ≥ 0.
The meaning of SYM and POS is clear.
We say that ψ satisﬁes separability (SEP) if for all cstp (N0,C) and S ⊂ N
satisfying m(N0,C)=m(S0,C)+m((N \ S)0 ,C),
ψi (N0,C)=
(
ψi (S0,C) if i ∈ S
ψi ((N \ S)0 ,C) if i ∈ N \ S.
Two subset of agents, S and N\S, can connect to the source separately or can
connect jointly. If there are no savings when they connect jointly, separability
says that agents must pay the same in both circumstances.
10This property appears in Megiddo (1978), Granot and Huberman (1981),
and Granot and Maschler (1998). They use the name decomposition, instead of
separability, and study its relation to the core and the nucleolus of (N,vC). For
instance, Granot and Huberman (1981) prove that the core and the nucleolus
satisfy SEP. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004b) use the name separability.
We say that ψ satisﬁes population monotonicity (PM) if for all cstp (N0,C),
all S ⊂ N, and all i ∈ S,
ψi (N0,C) ≤ ψi (S0,C).
PM says that if new agents join a society no agent of the initial society can
be worse. This is a well-known property, which has been used in many diﬀerent
problems.
We now present two propositions. In Proposition 2 we prove that ϕ satisﬁes
SYM, SEP, and RA. In Proposition 3 we prove that there exists a unique rule
satisfying these properties when N has at least three members.
Proposition 2. ϕ satisﬁes SYM, SEP, and RA.
Proof. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004b) prove that ϕ satisﬁes SEP.
We now prove that ϕ satisﬁes SYM.L e t(N0,C) be a cstp and let i,j ∈ N
be two symmetric agents. We prove that ϕi (N0,C)=ϕj (N0,C).
Given a cstp (N0,C) we denote by
¡
S0,C+T¢
the cstp obtained from (N0,C)
assuming that agents of S have to be connected and agents of T are already
connected. This means that c
+T
ij = cij for all i,j ∈ S and c
+T



































lk for all l,k ∈ S0.




k∈S∪{i} is a mcst in
¡
(S ∪ {i})0 ,C+(N\(S∪{i}))¢
.
We deﬁne Si =
©
k ∈ S | k0 = i
ª
and let t0 be the network obtained when we
replace agent i by agent j in t, i.e.









11It is not diﬃcult to see that t0 is a mcst in
¡





C (S ∪ {i})=m
³








C (S ∪ {j}).






.S i n c e t h e



















i∈N be a mcst in (N0,C), (N0,C0), and (N0,C+ C0) satisfying
that there exists an order π =( i1,...,in) ∈ ΠN such that ci0
1i1 ≤ ci0






2i2 ≤ ... ≤ c0
i0
nin.
Assume that we compute the canonical form associated with the problems
(N0,C), (N0,C0),a n d(N0,C+ C0) through the algorithm. It is not diﬃcult to
prove that there exists (j1,...,jn) ∈ ΠN satisfying that:
• t∗ = {(jk−1,j k)}
n
k=1 is a mcst in the canonical matrices associated to
(N0,C), (N0,C0), and (N0,C+ C0). For convenience we take j0 =0 .





Applying Proposition 3 (a) of Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004b, page 20)
it is not diﬃcult to conclude that for all S ⊂ N,
v(C+C0)∗ (S)=vC∗ (S)+vC0∗ (S).





= Sh(N,vC∗ + vC0∗)
= Sh(N,vC∗)+Sh(N,vC0∗)=ϕ(N0,C)+ϕ(N0,C0).
This concludes the proof. ¥
Assume that N has at least three agents. Then we have the following result:
Proposition 3. There is a unique rule satisfying SYM, SEP,a n dRA.
Proof.N o r d eet al (2004) prove that if (N0,C) is a cstp, then there exists
af a m i l y{Cp}
a





2. For each p there exist xp ∈ R and a network gp such that c
p
ij = xp if
(i,j) ∈ gp and c
p
ij =0otherwise.




kl if and only if
cij ≤ ckl








































x1 =3 ,x 2 =2 ,a n dx3 =4 .
g1 = {(0,1),(0,2),(1,2)},g 2 = {(0,1),(0,2)},a n dg3 = {(0,2)}.
Let ψ be a rule satisfying SYM, SEP and RA.




By Proposition 1 we know that ψ satisﬁes CPL. Now Claim 1 is a conse-
quence of Conditions 1 and 3.
As a consequence of Claim 1 and Condition 2, it is enough to prove that ψ
is unique on the subclass of cstp (N0,C) satisfying that there exist x ∈ R and
an e t w o r kg such that cij = x if (i,j) ∈ g and cij =0otherwise.
We denote by {N1,N 2,...,Nq} the partition of N in C-components.
Claim 2.F o re a c hr =1 ,...,q and i ∈ Nr,ψ i (N0,C)=ψi ((Nr)0 ,C).




It is trivial to see that for each C-component Nr,
m((Nr)0 ,C)=
(
x if c0i = x for all i ∈ Nr
0 if there exists i ∈ Nr such that c0i =0 .
We assume, without loss of generality, that m((Nr)0 ,C)=0for all r =
1,...,q0 and m((Nr)0 ,C)=x for all r = q0 +1 ,...,q.








In any Stage k with k =2 ,...,




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯








Nr and ci0i =0 .
Because of the second condition in the deﬁnition of C-components,i ti sn o t
diﬃcult to see that if i ∈ Nr, j ∈ Nr0,a n dr 6= r0,t h e ncij = x.
This means that in Stage




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯





i ∈ Nq0+1, i0 =0 ,a n dci0i = x.
In any Stage k with k =




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
+2,...,




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯




such that i ∈ Nq0+1 and ci0i =0 .
Using similar arguments as those used before we can conclude that for all
s = q0,...,q − 1,
• In Stage








such that i ∈ Ns+1, i0 =0 ,
and ci0i = x.
• In any Stage k with k =
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T h i sc o m p l e t e st h ep r o o fo fC l a i m2 .





be a mcst in (N0,C). Then, there exists α ∈ N such that









0 if 0 ∈ {i,j}
cij otherwise.








ii0 =0for all i ∈ N \{ α},c 1
0α ≥ 0=c2
0α,a n d









0i =0for all i ∈ N, m
¡
{i}0 ,C2¢













Thus, it is enough to prove that ψ is unique in a cstp (N0,C) where cij =0
if 0 / ∈ {i,j} and c0i ∈ {0,x} for all i ∈ N.
Three cases are possible:
1. c0i = x for all i ∈ N. This means that all agents in N are symmetric. By




for all i ∈ N.
2. c0i =0for all i ∈ N. All agents are symmetric. Then, ψi (N0,C)=0for
all i ∈ N.
3. There exist j,k ∈ N such that c0j =0and c0k = x. We deﬁne N1 =






















if i ∈ N2.





=0if i ∈ N2.
Thus, it is enough to prove that ψ is unique in a cstp (N0,C) where there
exists k ∈ N such that c0i = x ∈ R if i 6= k and cij =0otherwise.
For each i ∈ N \{ k} let Ci be such that ci
0i = x and ci
jl =0otherwise.




t = {(j − 1,j)}
n
j=2 ∪ {(0,k)}
is a mcst in
¡
N0,Ci¢















































It only remains to prove that ψ is unique in cstp ({i,k},C) where c0k =
cik =0and c0i = x.
Since m({i,k}0 ,C)=0we can assume that ψ ({i,k}0 ,C)=( yik,−yik).
We now prove that yik =0 .
Let (N0,C0) be such that N = {i,j,k}, c0
0i = x, and c0
hl =0otherwise. We
can ﬁnd such a (N0,C0) because N has at least three members.
Then, m(N0,C0)=m({j}0 ,C0)+m({i,k}0 ,C0).B ySEP,
ψk (N0,C0)=ψk ({i,k}0 ,C0)=−yik.
Moreover, m(N0,C0)=m({i,j}0 ,C0)+m({k}0 ,C0).B ySEP, ψk (N0,C0)=
ψk ({k}0 ,C0)=0 . Then, yik =0 .
This concludes the proof. ¥
The next theorem is a trivial consequence of Propositions 2 and 3.
Theorem 1.I f N has at least three members, then ϕ is the unique rule
satisfying SYM, SEP,a n dRA.
We now prove that the properties used in Theorem 1 are independent.
• Given N ⊂ N we denote by πN the order induced in N by the index of
the agents, i.e.g i v e n i,j ∈ N, πN (i) <π N (j) if and only if i<j .For














It is not diﬃcult to prove that O satisﬁes RA and SEP.












Agents 1 and 2 are symmetric but ψ(N0,C)=( 1 0 ,2).




all i ∈ N. It is not diﬃcult to see that E satisﬁes RA and SYM.












Then, m({1}0 ,C)=2 ,m({2},C)=4 , and m(N0,C)=6 . But E1 ({1}0 ,C)=
3 and E1 ({2}0 ,C)=3 .
• Bird (1976) introduced a rule in a particular subclass of cstp.W ed e n o t e
this rule as B. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004b) extend B to the class
of all cstp and they prove that it satisﬁes SEP. It is not diﬃcult to see
that B also satisﬁes SYM.
Nevertheless, B does not satisfy RA. Consider the cstp where N = {1,2}






























t = {(0,1),(1,2)} is a mcst in (N0,C), (N0,C0), and (N0,C+ C0). But
B (N0,C)=( 6 ,6),B(N0,C0)=( 1 0 ,2),a n dB (N0,C+ C0)=( 2 0 ,4).
The next corollary gives another characterization of ϕ.
Corollary 1. ϕ i st h eu n i q u er u l es a t i s f y i n gSYM, PM, and RA.
Proof. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004b) prove that ϕ satisﬁes PM and
that PM implies SEP (if a rule satisﬁes PM, it also satisﬁes SEP).
Now Corollary 1 is a trivial consequence of Theorem 1. ¥
It is not diﬃcult to prove that Corollary 1 is also a tight characterization
result.
The next theorem is the analogous to Theorem 1 when N has two agents.
Theorem 2.I f N has two agents, ϕ is the unique rule satisfying POS,
SYM, SEP, and RA.
17Proof. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004b) prove that ϕ satisﬁes POSand
SEP. By Proposition 2 we know that ϕ satisﬁes SYM and RA.
We now prove the uniqueness. Let ψ be a rule satisfying POS,SYM,SEP,
and RA.
If N = {i}, by deﬁnition ψi (N0,C)=m(N0,C)=c0i.
Assume that N = {i,j}. Using arguments similar to those used in the proof
of Proposition 3, we can conclude that it is enough to prove that ψ is unique in
cstp ({i,j}0 ,C) where c0i = cij =0and c0j = x.
Since m(N0,C)=0 , ψi (N0,C)=−ψj (N0,C). By POS, ψi (N0,C)=
ψj (N0,C)=0 . ¥
We end this section by proving that the properties used in Theorem 2 are
independent.
It is not diﬃcult to see that when N has two agents, O satisﬁes SEP, RA,
and POS but fails SYM; E satisﬁes SYM, RA, and POS but fails SEP; and
B satisﬁes SEP, SYM, and POS but fails RA.
We now prove that POS is independent of the other properties. Assume,
without loss of generality, that N = {i,j} and c0i ≤ c0j. We consider the rule
A deﬁned as
Ai (N0,C)=ϕi (N0,C) − max{0,c 0j − max{c0i,c ij}} and
Aj (N0,C)=ϕj (N0,C)+m a x{0,c 0j − max{c0i,c ij}}.
A satisﬁes SYM. Assume that i and j are symmetric. Then, c0i = c0j and
hence
Ai (N0,C)=ϕi (N0,C)=ϕj (N0,C)=Aj (N0,C).
A satisﬁes SEP.Assume that m(N0,C)=m({i}0 ,C)+m({j}0 ,C). Then,
cij ≥ c0j and hence A(N0,C)=ϕ(N0,C). Since ϕ satisﬁes SEP we conclude
that A satisﬁes SEP.
A satisﬁes RA.L e t (N0,C0) and t be as in the deﬁnition of RA.W eo n l y
prove that Ai (N0,C+ C0)=Ai (N0,C)+Ai (N0,C0) (the proof for agent j is
similar). Three cases are possible:






Ai (N0,C)=ϕi (N0,C) − c0j +m a x{c0i,c ij} ,
Ai (N0,C0)=ϕi (N0,C0) − c0



















18We know that ϕ satisﬁes RA and c0i ≤ cij if and only if c0
0i ≤ c0
ij. Now, it
is easy to conclude that Ai (N0,C+ C0)=Ai (N0,C)+Ai (N0,C0).
2. t = {(i,j),(0,j)}. Since t is a mcst in (N0,C) and (N0,C0),w ec o n c l u d e
that c0i ≥ c0j, c0
0i ≥ c0
0j,c ij ≤ c0i, and c0
ij ≤ c0
0i. Now it is similar to Case
1, simply by writing i instead of j and j instead of i.
3. t = {(0,i),(0,j)}. Then, Ai (N0,C)=c0i,A i (N0,C0)=c0
0i, and Ai (N0,C+ C0)=
c0i + c0
0i.
Nevertheless, A does not satisfy POS.Let (N0,C) be the cstp where c0j =1 ,
and c0i = cij =0 . Then, A(N0,C)=( −1,1).
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this section we compare our characterization of ϕ with the characterization
g i v e ni nB r a n z e iet al (2003). In both papers an additivity property plays an
important role.
Branzei et al (2003) characterize ϕ as the only rule satisfying eﬃciency
(EF), equal treatment (ET), upper bound contributions (UBC),a n dCPL.
Ar u l eψ satisﬁes EF if
P
i∈N
ψi (N0,C)=m(N0,C) for all cstp (N0,C).
Branzei et al (2003) do not include EF in the deﬁnition of a rule. If we do
not include it, we will obtain that ϕ is the only rule satisfying EF, SYM, SEP,
and RA. Moreover, the independence of EF from the other properties is shown
by the rule ψi (N0,C)=0for all cstp (N0,C) and all i ∈ N.
The C-components are crucial in the deﬁnition of ET and UBC.
Ar u l eψ satisﬁes ET if given a cstp (N0,C) and a C-component S, ψi (N0,C)=
ψj (N0,C) for all i,j ∈ S.
Ar u l eψ satisﬁes UBC if given a cstp (N0,C) and a C-component S,
P
i∈S
ϕi (N0,C) ≤ min
i∈S
{c0i}.
Branzei et al (2003) do not give any reason why a fair rule should satisfy
ET or UBC.
We do not know what the principle behind ET is. Assume that (N0,C) is a
cstp where N = {1,2,3} and
C =

   

0 1 22 04 0
12 0 0 35
20 0 0 0
40 35 0 0

   

.
19In this problem N is the unique C-component. Then, ET says that all agents
must pay the same. We do not understand why a fair rule must assign the same
cost to each agent.
Nevertheless, we see a principle behind UBC.




ψi (N0,C) ≤ m(S0,C).
This property says that no group of agents can be better constructing their
own network instead of paying what the rule ψ proposes to them. CS is a
property widely used in cstp.
Notice that if S is a C-component,t h e nm(S0,C)=m i n
i∈S
{c0i}. Then, UBC
can be reinterpreted as a property of CS restricted to C-components.
It is known that ϕ satisﬁes CS.S i n c eCS implies UBC the result of Branzei
et al (2003) can be reformulated saying that ϕ is the only rule satisfying EF,
ET, CS, and CPL.
We now comment the main diﬀerences between our proof of the characteri-
zation of ϕ a n dt h ep r o o fo fB r a n z e iet al (2003).
The proof of the existence (ϕ satisﬁes the properties) is completely diﬀer-
ent. Our proof is made using the canonical matrix and other results stated in
Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004b). The proof of Branzei et al (2003) is made
through Kruskal’s algorithm.
The uniqueness has two parts in both proofs. First part. In both papers it
is proved that ψ(N0,C)=
a P
p=1
ψ (N0,Cp). If a rule satisﬁes CPL, this part is
an immediate consequence of the results obtained in Norde et al (2004). In this
paper we only need to prove that RA implies CPL (Proposition 1).
Second part. In both papers it is proved that ψ is unique in each problem
(N0,Cp). In the proof of Branzei et al (2003) it is an immediate consequence
of the properties of ET and UBC. In our paper we need a more complicated
argument.
We end this section comparing the properties used in our characterization
result with the properties used in the characterization result given in Branzei
et al (2003).
We already mentioned that we have included EF in the deﬁnition of a rule.
As we have proved in Proposition 1, RA implies CPL.
Given a cstp (N0,C), let {N1,N 2,...,Np} be the partition of N in C-
components. This partition will be used in the next rules we deﬁne.
20SYM and ET are unrelated.
• The egalitarian rule satisﬁes SYM but not ET.
• We deﬁne ψ
1 as follows. If {N1,N 2,...,Np} = {{1},...,{n}} we take
ψ
1
1 (N0,C)=m(N0,C) and ψ
1
i (N0,C)=0if i 6=1 . If {N1,N 2,...,Np} 6=
{{1},...,{n}} we take ψ
1 (N0,C)=ϕ(N0,C).
It is not diﬃcult to see that ψ
1 satisﬁes ET but fails SYM.
SEP and UBC are unrelated.
• We deﬁne ψ







m(N0,C) for all i ∈ N.If {N1,N 2,...,Np} 6= {{1},...,{n}}
we take ψ
2 (N0,C)=ϕ(N0,C).
Since ϕ satisﬁes UBC,i ti sn o td i ﬃcult to see that ψ
2 also satisﬁes UBC.
Nevertheless ψ
2 fails SEP. We consider (N0,C) where
C =






18 20 20 0

   

Making some computations we obtain that the partition in C-components
is {{1},{2},{3}}, m(N0,C)=3 0 , m({1,2}0 ,C)=1 2 , m({3}0 ,C)=
18,a n dψ
2 (N0,C)=( 7 .5,7.5,15). Then, ψ
2 does not satisfy SEP because
ψ
2
3 (N0,C)=1 56=1 8=ψ
2
3 ({3}0 ,C).
• Given x ∈ RN with 1,2 ∈ N,w ed e ﬁne fN (x) ∈ RN as the vector
fN
1 (x)=x1 + x2, fN
1 (x)=0and fN
i (x)=xi for all i ∈ N\{1,2}.
Moreover, we deﬁne N∗ ⊂ N as the set of agents i ∈ N such that there
exists a mcst t ∈ GN
0 satisfying that the arc (0,i) belongs to t.N a m e l y ,
N∗ =
©
i ∈ N | ∃mcst t ∈ GN







fN (ϕ(N0,C)) if 1,2 ∈ N, c01 <c 12 <c 02 and 1 ∈ N∗
ϕ(N0,C) otherwise.
It is not diﬃcult to prove that ψ
3 satisﬁes SEP.
Nevertheless, ψ
3 fails UBC.W e c o n s i d e r (N0,C) where N = {1,2},
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